Strategic Infrastructure, Strategic Influence

A U.S. foreign policy reset for a multipolar world

Sylvain Faust
Originally completed March 27, 2025

Executive Summary

U.S. foreign policy reset – As global power dynamics shift toward multipolar competition, the United States must adopt a more agile and pragmatic strategic posture to counter the expanding influence of China and Russia—particularly across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The international economic order, once governed by institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), is eroding under the weight of inconsistent enforcement, political deadlock, and the failure to hold states like China accountable for unfair trade practices. At the same time, emerging and developing economies are turning toward Beijing and Moscow—not out of ideological alignment, but in pursuit of reliable infrastructure, energy development, and non-interventionist partnerships. China’s recent launch of a major cement plant in Burkina Faso, and Russia’s agreement to build a nuclear power facility in the same country, exemplify this growing foothold.

In response, the United States should reframe its foreign engagement strategy through three pillars: regional economic integration, targeted development diplomacy, and flexible security cooperation. This begins not with distant partnerships, but by reaffirming America’s closest alliance—with Canada. Canada is not only the United States’ largest trading partner and a deeply aligned democracy, but also a critical partner in shared infrastructure, supply chains, and clean energy. Renewing and strengthening the bilateral economic compact with Canada would serve as a powerful demonstration of the kind of respectful, resilient partnerships the United States intends to build globally.

The strategy must then expand outward—deepening regional trade agreements beyond North America to include strategic Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, Australia, India, and ASEAN nations. In parallel, Washington must overhaul development instruments, such as USAID, to focus on high-impact investment projects in infrastructure, local industry, and digital connectivity. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—facing violent extremism and fragile governance—present immediate opportunities for U.S. re-engagement through military support upon invitation, paired with tangible economic assistance that respects national sovereignty and defers political conditionality in the short term.

This strategy is not a nostalgic return to Cold War-style power plays but a recognition that influence today is won less through ideology than through credible, transparent partnerships and reliable investment. If the U.S. fails to adapt, it will continue to cede ground to actors whose long-term goals are antithetical to democratic norms and open markets. If it acts decisively—starting with trusted partners like Canada and extending to regions seeking alternatives to authoritarian engagement—it can reclaim strategic ground and reshape its role as a trusted global partner in an era of fragmentation.

This strategy outlines a framework for a true U.S. foreign policy reset, rooted in regional partnerships and development-focused diplomacy.

I. U.S. Foreign Policy Reset: Adapting to the New Global Playing Field

The global strategic landscape has shifted irreversibly. The liberal international order, once underpinned by American economic and military pre-eminence, is being actively contested by assertive powers such as China and Russia. Their approach is not simply about expanding spheres of influence through ideology or military presence, but through the deliberate deployment of infrastructure investment, trade relationships, and non-conditional partnerships—especially in the Global South.

China has perfected this model through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which now spans over 140 countries and includes critical investments in ports, roads, digital networks, and energy infrastructure. Its recent move to open a major cement plant in Burkina Faso is emblematic of this strategy: low-key, commercially framed, but geopolitically potent. Russia has adopted a parallel approach, offering military support and energy infrastructure—most notably a planned nuclear power facility in Burkina Faso via its state agency Rosatom, despite the country’s ongoing political instability.

The United States and its allies, meanwhile, have struggled to counter this influence in part due to overreliance on a faltering multilateral framework. The World Trade Organization (WTO), once the bedrock of global commerce, has lost both legitimacy and efficacy. It failed to enforce reciprocal trade norms with China, which joined in 2001 with expectations of gradual liberalization that never fully materialized. Instead, China retained heavy state subsidies, restricted market access, and engaged in widespread violations of intellectual property rights. Today, the WTO’s Appellate Body remains effectively defunct due to prolonged U.S. opposition to judicial appointments, rendering the organization incapable of arbitrating disputes.

This erosion of global trade governance is reflected in a landscape of tariff asymmetries. The European Union currently imposes a 10% tariff on U.S.-made vehicles, while the United States imposes only 2.5% on cars imported from the EU. More starkly, China imposes a total of 25% tariffs on U.S. vehicles—15% base tariff and an additional 10% on larger engine cars—compared to the United States’ modest 2.5% tariff on Chinese vehicles. These imbalances underscore the need for a strategic reset in how the U.S. and its allies approach trade, investment, and diplomatic engagement.

The emerging global order is not post-American, but it is decidedly post-unipolar. The U.S. must navigate this terrain not through nostalgia for institutional multilateralism, but by adapting to a world where power is exercised through credible, flexible, and interest-based alliances—especially those built at the regional and bilateral levels.

II. Regionalism Over Globalism: The Core of a U.S. Foreign Policy Reset

As multilateralism continues to falter, regionalism has emerged as the most viable path forward for economic integration and geopolitical resilience. For the United States, the priority must now be to consolidate and expand regional trade frameworks that are strategically aligned, economically reciprocal, and politically feasible. This is not a retreat from global engagement, but a recognition that continental and regional blocs offer a more practical foundation for twenty-first-century trade and security cooperation.

The North American model—refreshed through the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA)—demonstrates how geographically linked economies can integrate supply chains, harmonize standards, and create leverage as a collective actor. Expanding this approach beyond North America is both necessary and urgent, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where geopolitical competition is most acute.

The Indo-Pacific region is increasingly sceptical of China’s intentions. Countries such as Japan, Australia, and India are growing wary of Beijing’s economic coercion and territorial assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea and along disputed land borders. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines have demonstrated a willingness to diversify trade and security partnerships as long as these partnerships do not come with overbearing political conditions. These nations represent a significant opportunity for the United States to lead the creation of an Indo-Pacific Economic Compact—a partnership focused on secure supply chains, high-standard infrastructure, and mutually beneficial market access.

The failure of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to gain traction in the U.S. political sphere left a void that China has partially filled through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, RCEP lacks both effective enforcement mechanisms and trust, as many of its members remain uneasy with China’s dominance. A renewed U.S. initiative—built on lessons learned from the collapse of the TPP—could offer an alternative grounded in transparency, reciprocity, and strategic investment, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure.

This regionalist approach also aligns with broader strategic imperatives. It allows for:

• The resilience of supply chains by shifting production and logistics away from China and toward allied economies;
• The protection of intellectual property and high-tech industries;
• The deepening of trust with middle powers who are essential for balancing Chinese and Russian influence.

Crucially, regional trade pacts also enable the U.S. to respond more nimbly to economic coercion, such as China’s informal boycotts of Australian coal and wine, or the weaponization of rare earth mineral exports. By embedding these nations in U.S.-led trade architecture, Washington can both insulate allies from retaliation and demonstrate long-term economic reliability.

Rather than seeking to revive a global rules-based system that no longer functions in practice, the United States should anchor its economic leadership in layered, resilient, and values-aligned regional partnerships. This is not isolationism; it is realism—attuned to the dynamics of an increasingly contested and fragmented world.

See also: Canada’s Gold Reserves — A Strategic Overview

A credible strategy of regional and global engagement must begin by reaffirming the strength and dignity of America’s closest alliance—Canada. While some recent rhetoric has flirted with unserious or disrespectful proposals, including suggestions that Canada could become the 51st state, such narratives—however flippant—undermine the very principles of mutual respect and sovereign partnership the United States seeks to champion abroad. Canada is not only the U.S.’s largest trading partner, but a deeply aligned democracy with shared values, integrated supply chains, and complementary resources vital to economic and strategic resilience. A renewed bilateral economic compact—one that invests in joint infrastructure, clean energy, digital standards, and industrial competitiveness—would serve as a visible demonstration of the kind of partnership Washington hopes to cultivate elsewhere. In doing so, the United States would not only strengthen the foundation of continental cooperation, but signal to the world that it builds alliances through respect—not rhetoric—and leads by example.

Also read: F-35 Cancellation — Economic Risks & the Gripen Alternative for Canada

III. U.S. Foreign Policy Reset in Africa: Strategic Re-Engagement in the Sahel

While the Indo-Pacific garners much of the strategic spotlight, the Sahel region of Africa has emerged as one of the most contested geopolitical arenas, where external powers are exploiting economic vacuum and security crises—most notably Russia and China. The United States, which once enjoyed strong bilateral relations and influence in West Africa, is now conspicuously absent from the region’s most critical development and security conversations. Re-engagement is not only feasible, but it is also urgently required.

The Sahel nations of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are grappling with cascading challenges: jihadist insurgencies affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda, declining public services, political instability, and economic stagnation. In this context, traditional Western aid—conditioned on democratic reforms or human rights benchmarks—has often been perceived as both out of touch and politically intrusive. Meanwhile, external actors like Russia and China have stepped into the breach with less conditional, more transactional offerings.

Russia has positioned itself as a security partner of last resort. Through both formal agreements and informal deployments via Wagner-affiliated forces, it has offered tactical support and military training in Mali and Burkina Faso. More strategically, Moscow’s proposal to construct a nuclear power plant in Burkina Faso through its state-owned Rosatom agency signals a shift from short-term military involvement to long-term infrastructure entrenchment.

China’s approach has been more commercially framed, yet no less strategic. In early 2025, it opened the Société Industrielle Sino-Burkina de Ciments SA—a cement plant capable of producing 2,000 tonnes per day. The facility is not just an industrial asset; it is a statement of commitment to physical development, employment, and national sovereignty, all with minimal political interference. Similar efforts across Africa, including railway projects, stadium construction, and digital infrastructure funded by Chinese firms and banks, have enhanced Beijing’s credibility.

In contrast, the United States has largely retreated from meaningful engagement, relying on multilateral aid channels and security assistance programs that are either suspended or politically misaligned. However, these countries have not closed the door to the West. What they seek is not ideological alignment but partnership rooted in mutual respect, responsiveness, and tangible outcomes.

A viable U.S. strategy would start with security cooperation offered only upon local invitation, focused on intelligence-sharing, counterterrorism training, and logistical support. But it must go further—offering robust economic investment that fills immediate gaps in energy, transportation, agriculture, and urban infrastructure. Examples such as Panama’s request for assistance in building a new bridge over the Panama Canal, or Burkina Faso’s interest in national rail connectivity, are precisely the kind of strategic projects that should be prioritized.

Importantly, this approach must defer political conditionality in the short term. These nations are in crisis; they require stabilization before they can pursue liberal democratic consolidation. A phased model—where economic and security partnerships lay the groundwork for governance reform—would prove more effective and more respectful of national sovereignty. Democratic elections should remain the long-term objective, but not the entry requirement for U.S. engagement.

Strategic re-engagement in the Sahel offers the United States a rare opportunity: to counter authoritarian influence, restore credibility, and demonstrate that its presence in Africa is neither transactional nor paternalistic—but grounded in partnership, investment, and mutual security.

IV. USAID 2.0: A Tool for Modern Geopolitics

In a world increasingly shaped by infrastructure diplomacy, the United States must evolve its development policy to match the scale and strategic purpose of its competitors. A reimagined USAID 2.0 should serve as a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy, focusing not merely on aid distribution but on co-developing transformative infrastructure projects that reinforce bilateral relationships, build economic opportunity abroad, and generate tangible benefits at home.

Recent developments in Panama illustrate what this approach could look like in practice. The country is pursuing two of the most significant infrastructure projects in Central America: a cross-country railway and a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal. Both are stalled or underdeveloped—and both present powerful opportunities for U.S. leadership.

A Strategic Shift: From China’s Belt and Road to U.S. Re-Engagement

In early 2025, Panama officially withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), citing limited engagement and lack of meaningful benefits. This marks a significant shift away from Chinese-backed infrastructure development, including the early involvement of Chinese state-owned firms in the proposed bridge over the Canal. Panama’s leadership has made it clear: the country is still pursuing major infrastructure, but is now seeking more trusted and transparent partners.

This includes the Panama-David Railway, a 400+ kilometre national railway linking the capital to the western province of Chiriquí. In December 2024, Panama awarded a US$2.2 million contract to AECOM, a Texas-based global infrastructure firm, to update the master plan. This contract represents not only a technical contribution but a strategic opening for expanded American commercial involvement.

Likewise, Panama’s fourth bridge over the Canal—a critical project that would connect Panama City to its growing western suburbs and ease daily congestion for more than 70,000 vehicles—has seen years of delays. While originally awarded to a Chinese consortium, the project has now stalled, with only 17–18% of work reportedly completed. In light of Panama’s withdrawal from the BRI, this is precisely the kind of high-profile, high-impact project where the U.S. should be stepping in.

U.S. Involvement: Not Just Beneficial, but Profitable

Projects like these benefit partner nations—but they also offer clear, measurable advantages to the United States:

• Export of U.S. services and technology: Engineering firms like AECOM provide design, project management, and feasibility studies. But the opportunity expands beyond engineering. U.S.-based construction firms, logistics companies, and materials suppliers benefit directly when their services and products are embedded in international infrastructure development.
• Support for American jobs: These projects create employment opportunities not only in the host country but across the U.S., through sourcing of steel, software, heavy machinery, and technical expertise.
• Strategic visibility: American participation signals reliability and transparency, offering an alternative to opaque Chinese loan agreements and build-operate-transfer models that often leave countries in long-term debt.
• Local impact with global returns: Infrastructure like the Panama railway or Canal bridge helps create jobs, promote regional integration, and stimulate economic growth in partner nations—while forging lasting political goodwill and commercial ties.

Five Pillars for USAID 2.0

To maximize its effectiveness, a revitalized USAID should be restructured around five key pillars:

1. Strategic Infrastructure
   Projects like the Panama Canal bridge or West African railways should be top priorities—not only for their economic development potential, but for their geostrategic value in stabilizing key regions and expanding U.S. presence.
2. Local Industry and Capacity Development
   USAID should partner with U.S. companies to develop in-country capacity—helping nations manufacture their own construction materials, manage logistics, and operate public services, rather than relying entirely on foreign contractors.
3. Digital and Educational Infrastructure
   Investing in fibre-optic cables, mobile networks, and tech training centres will foster digitally fluent, upwardly mobile populations—while also opening space for American technology firms and standards.
4. Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs)
   USAID must act as a connector between U.S. firms and emerging markets—working in coordination with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Ex-Im Bank, and private capital to derisk investments.
5. Trust, Transparency, and Sovereignty
   American involvement should emphasize open contracting, environmental responsibility, and respect for national priorities. This distinguishes U.S.-backed projects from those associated with debt traps or strategic capture.

Reclaiming the Ground Others Left

Panama is not an isolated case. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, countries are increasingly questioning the long-term benefits of Chinese infrastructure. Many, like Panama, are seeking alternatives—but the U.S. has too often failed to show up. A proactive USAID 2.0 could change that, turning missed opportunities into long-term partnerships built on mutual gain.

In short, infrastructure development is no longer a side conversation—it is central to geopolitics. And when American firms help build bridges, railways, ports, and power plants abroad, they’re not just building for others—they’re building a more secure, interconnected future for the United States itself.

Conclusion

The global landscape is shifting, and the United States must adapt—not by chasing a return to old paradigms, but by embracing a pragmatic strategy rooted in regional partnerships, economic realism, and credible development leadership. The failures of multilateral institutions like the WTO, the uneven application of trade rules, and the rise of authoritarian economic diplomacy have exposed the limits of the post–Cold War order. In its place, a new contest is unfolding—one defined by connectivity, infrastructure, and the ability to deliver visible results.

China and Russia have moved assertively into this space. They are offering developing nations roads, power plants, and digital infrastructure—often with fewer political conditions, but at a high strategic price. The United States has the capacity to respond, but doing so requires a shift in posture: less emphasis on conditionality and ideological alignment in the short term, and more emphasis on trust-building, co-investment, and shared benefit.

This begins with leveraging regional trade frameworks that reflect today’s realities: deepening North American integration, building Indo-Pacific coalitions that are sceptical of Beijing’s rise, and supporting democratic resilience through economic opportunity—not just in theory, but through steel, cement, and skilled labour. It extends to strategic re-engagement in regions like the Sahel, where governments are still open to partnership, but only if the United States brings more than rhetoric.

Above all, it demands the transformation of USAID from an aid agency into a true development and investment partner—one that helps deliver the infrastructure of stability while exporting American expertise, standards, and commercial value.

This is not a call for a new Cold War. It is a call for smart, patient, and grounded statecraft, one that recognises that in today’s world, influence is not declared—it is built. Built in the form of railways in Panama, bridges over canals, power grids in Burkina Faso, and factories that employ and empower. When the United States chooses to build with others, it not only strengthens those nations—it rebuilds its own position as a global leader worth choosing.

References

1. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Status
   • World Trade Organization. “Dispute Settlement Body Appellate Body.” www.wto.org
2. Tariff Comparisons (EU, China, U.S. Auto Tariffs)
   • European Commission. “Trade in Goods with United States.”
   • U.S. International Trade Administration. “Automotive Tariffs.”
   • Reuters. “China imposes 25% tariffs on U.S. autos.” (2025)
   • Financial Times. “Trade war drives EU and US closer on car tariffs.” (2025)
3. China’s Belt and Road Engagements
   • The World Bank. “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors.”
   • Council on Foreign Relations. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Economic or Geopolitical Strategy?”
4. Burkina Faso – China Cement Plant & Russia Nuclear Deal
   • Business Insider Africa. “Burkina Faso’s Junta Opens Cement Plant With Chinese Support.” (March 2025)
   • Reuters. “Burkina Faso, Russia’s Rosatom Sign Agreement for Nuclear Power Plant.” (October 2023)
   • Africanews. “Russia to Build Nuclear Plant in Burkina Faso.”
5. Panama – Railway and Canal Bridge Projects
   • SCMP. “Panama Pulls Out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” (February 2025)
   • Tico Times. “Costa Rica Railway Link to Panama Gets Green Light.” (January 2025)
   • Hellenic Shipping News. “Construction of Fourth Bridge Over Panama Canal Behind Schedule.” (2025)
   • Newsroom Panama. “David–Panama Train: First Phase to Last Several Months.” (January 2025)
   • AECOM. Company Profile. www.aecom.com
6. Sahel Geopolitics and Wagner Involvement
   • BBC News. “Russia’s Wagner Group Expanding in Africa.”
   • Foreign Policy. “The Sahel is the Next Front in the Global Power Struggle.”
   • Africa Report. “Why Burkina Faso Turned to Russia.”
7. USMCA and Regional Trade Alignment
   • Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). “United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA).”
   • Brookings Institution. “Regional Trade Deals in the Indo-Pacific: Lessons From TPP and RCEP.”
8. Canada-U.S. Trade and Strategic Partnership
   • Government of Canada. “Canada–United States Economic Relationship.”
   • Statistics Canada. “Canada’s Merchandise Trade by Country.”
   • Globe and Mail. “Trump Floats Idea of Canada Joining the U.S. as a 51st State.” (2024)

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